Barot's treatise about his experiences as a fighter for a militia active in Kashmir is an important document widely circulated in the UK (Al-Hindi 1999) . The book, written under the kunya of Esa al-Hindi, was published by a Birmingham bookshop, the Maktabah al-Ansar, an important source for the dissemination of so-called 'salafi-jihadi' material in the UK. His book exudes a piercing political sensibility, one occasionally poetic in it flourishes. His language as an operative is quite different:
Even in suicidal missions we might not live long enough to deliver a very highly radioactive RDD [radioactive dispersal device] that uses gamma-emitting sources and is not shielded. If we tried to protect ourselves by shielding the source, the weight of the RDD could significantly increase thereby increasing the difficulty of delivering the device and causing successful dispersion of the radioactive material. 2 The formal register of this operational language is quite different from what is often seen as the irrational fanaticism of 'jihadis'. Barot openly calls his plans terrorist ones, intended to cause terror and chaos in London (unusually for this genre, he also refers to 'suicidal' actions.) The Madrid public transport bombings and the death of 191 commuters were considered by him to be a 'respectable' operation 3 .
As early as 1999, before the invasion of Iraq and the 2001 attacks in New York, Barot was promoting 'flank operations' that were to be undertaken in western countries using great stealth (Al-Hindi 1999, p.116-7) . He was proposing this strategy in the late Can migrant politics or the politics of migration make sense of Dhiren Barot and the tendencies he represents? This Special Issue is about the political mobilization of migrant groups and the paths through which migrants do or do not become politically 'incorporated', 'integrated' or 'assimilated'. The absence of political 'incorporation' is not equivalent to a path towards political violence (as if the binary of democracy / terror completes all political possibilities, or sets apart two ideas that might be related in some circumstances.) However, it is unclear that nation-focused and state-centric approaches can properly account for non-violent transnational migrant politics, let alone the real and alleged plots to commit violence against formal civilians that we have seen recently.
If the paradigmatic events for migration studies are movements from the rural to the urban and from the 'periphery' to the west, Dhiren Barot's key journeys exemplify the exact opposite. These 'jihadi' journeys make sense because affiliates are 'integrated' and competently 'worlded'. This 'worlding' can be reliant on peripheral urban to peripheral rural migration that bypasses the cosmopolitan metropolitan experience; or it can be based in largely metropolitan settings, and in travel from and through them rather than migration to them 4 ; or it can depend on the social competencies required to However, generalising approaches that invoke 'global terrorism' can elide many key distinctions between movements, groups, tendencies, ideologies and regions, and can become analytically pejorative in situations where specificity might be definitive. We might summarize some of the sociological problems as follows.
Topologies of omnipresence. The spatial and organizational topology of the 'global jihadi movement' are characterised in many inconsistent ways. It is a protean, shape-shifting transnational entity that refuses to settle on any one organizational form, but it is also which is nevertheless politically and ideologically rigid and doctrinaire and has enduring parts; or it is an entity hidden within social interstices but can also be manifest -both covert and spectacular; or it is operationally highly competent, patient and sophisticated, or incompetent, amateur and relies on luck and determination; or it is an entity having clearly recognised boundaries; or it is a dispersed, cellular assemblage, both acephalous and polycephalous, locally autonomous and having no recognisable boundaries that distinguish it from the societies, religions or 'civilizations' in which it is manifest; or it has no existence except as a brand ('Al Qaeda') or franchise (Bergen 2002) , an ideology (Burke 2004 ), a propaganda-media outfit (As-Sahab) or, simply, a metaphor that has causal powers across discontinuous times and spaces.
The inability of current taxonomy to describe convincingly the varieties of politicized religion or contain them within categorical boundaries (on this, see Roy 2004.) Hence, each tendency is considered sui generis (such as Al Qaeda) or compressed into a tripartite taxonomy (reformist, radical, revolutionary; moderate, radical, extremist; Islamist, salafi, salafi-jihadi.) Taxonomic problems proliferate, especially when south Asian political movements enter the analytical fray, and they usually do. Some analytical issues are a consequence of insufficient historical distance and an Al Qaeda-focused analysis starting from 2001 (such that the significant history of religious militias is taken to commence then) and working backwards into the Afghan jihad and the history of the Muslim Brotherhood or Wahhabi salafism from a perspective already settled by the 2001 events.
This approach can generate an historical account overdetermined by 'terror, terror, terror' (Fisk 2006) , one that necessarily solicits a distinctive political, ethical or emotional 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 partiality. Taxonomic issues also reflect difficulties in ascribing ideological boundaries to the phenomena. Thus, much discourse moves fluidly from political Islamists to terrorists, from civilian resistance to military occupation to anti-civilian terrorism, from hijab to human bomb. Boundary issues might be empirically real (a few 'liberal' Brelwi movements also engage in sectarian violence and possess militias engaged in 'jihad'), but also reflect deeply political issues -for example, both Israel and India have developed ferocious military strategies regarding colonized Palestine and Indian-controlled Kashmir as part of the US-led 'global war on terror'.
The dominance of the network analogy and the assumption of organizational consonance. The overwhelming view is that there is a transnational network -a sociologically corrigible 'global terrorist network' which penetrates diasporas in the west. The desire to impute organizational consonance across the network is manifested in the plethora of terms ('the global jihadi movement', 'global terrorism', 'terror networks') that attempt to describe a unitary transnational entity, even if regional discriminations are subsequently elaborated.
The assumption that there exists a global network that demonstrates organizational consonance and ideological familiality can nourish a political view of a tentacular global structure -or a high velocity phantasmatic intensity -that can strike civilians anywhere. It is not obvious that a geosocial topology based on the 'network' is necessarily valid, and its analytical use can displace other sociological dynamics, including non-linear transnational 'sovereignties' and the involvement of shadow states and parastatal militia combines (Bhatt 2007) . Further, the network narrative of 'global terrorism' functions partly because of the absence of data about the current form, capacity, intentions or precise whereabouts of the genuine Al Qaeda. Alternatively, well-described empirical instances are universalized, or very different 'networks', events, histories and regional settings are conflated. The aim is often to demonstrate an association between events or contribute little independent intellectual content.) The influence of 'jihadi' ideology is characteristically imagined in viral, epidemiological terms. It is popularly seen to animate several 'jihadi personalities': the grimly calculating, the frenzied, the deprived, the damaged, the sexually aggravated and the brainwashed. Hence also, the adiaphoric personality transforming instantly into the hostile one manifesting a fanatical haemophilia that has something to do with concupiscence and repression, primordial revenge and death fantasy. Similarly, the common doublet of ideas regarding 'terrorism as tactic' and 'terrorism as spectacle' for a mass mediated global audience, can displace other ways of understanding political violence that are not completed by analytical recourse to either instrumental rationality or fanatical totalitarianism. Anti-civilian political violence need not exemplify a strategy or tactic, but this also does not imply that it is simply the manifestation of a xenocidal ideology. (Additionally, it is not the commitment to a metaphysics of violence that is exceptional -numerous political tendencies, from varieties of neoconservatism to revolutionary Marxism and revolutionary feminism make an ideological pledge to some form of political violence against some formal civilians in some circumstances for the greater good of all humanity, even if the pledge is perpetually deferred.) 6 Theological salafism has also come under pressure from Saudi Arabia, which has made a concerted global effort to present Wahhabism and salafism as equivalent to peace and contrary to 'terrorism'. However, 'terrorism' and 'innocence' However, the 'clusters' are not necessarily existing socio-political groups but ones made distinct through criminal investigations (the network made visible through forensic, criminal and legal process is not necessarily the same as the geosocial network.) Much of the apparent configuration of UK clusters has resulted from intelligence obtained from (and therefore managed and constrained by the exigencies of) Pakistan's intelligence services, through the confessions of a few key individuals or through confessions obtained through torture.
ATERRITORIAL PARAMILITIAS
Other important aspects remain to be described accurately: changing transnational 'jihadi' pathways (especially post-2003), the anthropology of the militia and ideological camps and their substantial variety, the nature of different courses of instruction and training (though some of this is well known), the role of rural guides, instructors and camp amirs, the significance of peripatetic mercenaries, financial exchange, and other dynamics related to inter-militia relations. Virtually unremarked is the dense and sophisticated aesthetic universe created by religious militias. The aesthetic dimensions vary regionally but include consistent themes, motifs, lilt, nasheed, calligraphy, poetry and images.
Some information relevant to the UK is necessarily curtailed here and is described using public sources. But it is more accurate to speak of disparate 'operational'
and propaganda 'clusters' in the UK, some of which overlap others, some of which show tenuous links with other 'clusters' or individuals, others which are (or currently appear to it also relates to the shipping of equipment to Afghanistan, a theme in several cases.
These connections can be expanded much further in several directions and from various 'nodes', generating a sprawl of assemblages for which the network or the movement analytic seem like overdescriptions. It has become possible for many to apprehend 'salafi-jihadi' politics solely through the perspective of resistance to military occupation or the exigencies of a war situation. But consider these words of Masood Azhar, leader of the Jaish-e Mohammed:
...it is to express to the unbelievers that all Muslims are like one body, so to touch or cause harm to any part of the body is like challenging the whole body.
Similarly, to lift the hand against a Muslim's life, wealth or honour is similar to challenging the whole nation of the Muslims. (Azhar not dated, p. 132.) This philosophy of unconstrained spatial and temporal consequentialism may converge with that of Al Qaeda but is also independent of it. It takes each individual on the planet as in principle embodying responsibility for actions and consequences anywhere and anywhen. Rather than the dehumanization of the enemy that 'salafi-jihadis' are regularly accused of, it is a recognition of fully human political capacity. It is not that concerns about genuine military occupations are removed from this latter political form, but that they are intended to make sense only in that form. This is quite different from the formalities of political Islamist or communitarian Muslim identity politics in the UK. It demonstrates instead a desire by a small virtuous group to usurp the law of humanity and settle upon a precise identification between cosmos and nomos (Arendt, 1973) . Key ideas about virtue (the 'character of character') and approbation (akin to the honouring of moral character) recur in 'salafi-jihadi' discourse. A politics of virtue and character can exist relatively unbridled by the impersonal rule-imperative forms of 'the political' that are otherwise hosted by modernity. These ideas of virtue and approbation have 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
